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Abstract—In this study, the security of Novel Enhanced Quantum Representation (NEQR) of quantum images are suggested
by using the Quantum Fourier Transform (QFT ) with blind trent. In the protocol, QFT and keys are used to share signature with
recipients. So all members know only their signature information which are encrypted output of theQFT . This improves the security
of the protocol. In addition, the security of the protocol is provided by using reorder QFT output qubits with permutation of the blind
trent. The security analysis expresses security of the transfer of the image with effective secret key usage.
Keywords—Quantum Image Encryption and Authentication, Quantum Fourier Transform, Quantum Digital Signature.
1. Introduction
Conventional image security techniques, such as
digital watermarking and image encryption, are
commonly used to protect the image effectively.
Possible threats in image transmission are capturing
of image by unauthorized persons and authentica-
tion of the image. These issues are very important
for special applications such as transmission of
military satellite images or patient records.
There are many quantum image representations
such as the ”Qubit Lattice” representation for en-
coding a quantum image [1], the ”Real KET” rep-
resentation [2], Flexible Representation of Quantum
Image (FRQI) [3], Multi-Channel Representation
for Quantum Images (MCQI) [4], Novel Enhanced
Quantum Representation (NEQR) [5], Quantum Im-
age Representation for Log-Polar Images (QUALPI)
[6], Simple Quantum Representation of Infrared
Images (SQR) [7], Quantum States for M Colors
and N Coordinates (QSMC & QSNC) [8], Normal
Arbitrary Quantum Superposition State (NAQSS)
[9] and Quantum RGB Multi-Channel Representa-
tion (QMCR) [10].
Also, in the literature there some studies on the
security of quantum images. Iliyasu et. al. [11]
proposed the WaQI scheme based on restricted
geometric transformations for quantum image wa-
termarking and authentication. Iliyasu et. al. [12]
proposed the improved WaQI scheme which is se-
cure, keyless, blind and perfectly usable for authen-
tication of the image owner. Later, Iliyasu et. al. [13]
proposed GWaQI scheme with two-tier for greyscale
quantum image watermarking and recovery. Yan et.
al. [14] proposed MC WAQI model based on MCQI
representation for color quantum images.
In this study, we propose the protocol based on
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the QFT with blind Trent for image security and
authentication. The paper can be outlined as follows;
in Section 2,basic concepts of QFT and NEQR are
explained; In Section 3, base stages of the protocol
based on QFT with blind trent are introduced.
In Section 4, the security analysis of the protocol
according to forgery and repudiation concepts are
given. In Section 5, in the conclusion, some results
are discussed.
2. Related Works
2.1. Quantum Fourier Transform
Quantum Fourier transform is a application of
classical discrete Fourier transform to the quantum
states [15]. The QFT transform of an orthonormal
basis set |0〉 , |1〉 , ..., |N − 1〉 can be defined as
follows [15]:
|x〉 = 1√
N
N−1∑
y=0
e2piixy/N |y〉 (1)
Where N = 2n and orthonormal basis set is
|0〉 , |1〉 , ..., |2n − 1〉. The |x〉 state can be written
in binary form as x = x0x1...xN−1. The circuit of
Quantum Fourier Transform for |x〉 can be seen in
Fig.1. The |x〉 state is transformed into the phase of
qubits as results of the QFT transform.
Fig. 1. Quantum Fourier Transform Circuit [15]
2.2. NEQR
NEQR uses the basis states of qubit sequence
to store the color values. it represents grayscale
images. Suppose the gray scale of images is 2q.
Binary sequence C0Y XC
1
Y X ...C
q−2
Y XC
q−1
Y X encodes the
grayscale value f(Y,X) of the corresponding pixel
(Y,X) as follows [5]:
f (Y,X) = C0Y XC
1
Y X ...C
q−2
Y XC
q−1
Y X ,
CkY X ∈ [0, 1] , f (Y,X) ∈ [0, 2q − 1]
(2)
The representative expression of a quantum image
for a 2n × 2n image can be written as follows [5]:
|I〉 = 1
2n
2n−1∑
Y=0
2n−1∑
X=0
|f (Y,X)〉 |Y X〉
=
1
2n
2n−1∑
Y=0
2n−1∑
X=0
q−1⊗
i=0
|CiY X〉 |Y X〉
(3)
3. The Protocol based on QFT with
Blind Trent for NEQR Image
The participants of the protocol are Alice, Bob
and Trent. Alice would like to send 2q grayscale
2n × 2n NEQR quantum image |I〉 to Bob by
encrypting.In this case N = q + 2n. Blind Trent is
assumed as a manager of the protocol. Blind Trent
manages some communication to provide security
of the protocol. Bob can obtain and verify the image
|I〉 with help of the blind Trent.
The protocol can be described with following
phases.
Fig. 2. Security of NEQR quantum images
based on QFT with blind Trent
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3.1. Initialization Phase
(i) Alice shares secret key KAB with Bob. Also
blind Trent shares secret key KTA with Alice
and secret key KTB with Bob. Participant’s
secret keys KAB, KTA, KTB are shared by
using quantum key distribution(QKD) protocol
[16], [17]. The secret keys are used to en-
crypt quantum image to prevent any attackers.
The encryption algorithm is given in Eq. 10
and Eq. 11. The length of the all keys are
|K| = 8N . KAB, KTA, KTB secret keys are
created only once. Then the secret keys can
be divided into 8-bit pieces. Each piece of
the secret keys will be applied to every qubit
of the QFT output according to the permuta-
tion determined by the blind trend. Different
KAB, KTA, KTB secret keys are created for
each different sessions. If we apply stages in
[18] to the NEQR image and use secret keys,
we get the following stages.
(ii) Alice prepares her 2q grayscale 2n×2n image I
with NEQR model . We assume that the length
of the |I〉 is | |I〉 | = N .
|I〉 = 1
2n
2n−1∑
Y=0
2n−1∑
X=0
|f (Y,X)〉 |Y X〉
=
1
2n
2n−1∑
Y=0
2n−1∑
X=0
q−1⊗
i=0
|CiY X〉
n−1⊗
j=0
|yjY 〉
n−1⊗
j=0
|xjX〉
(4)
Where |CiY X〉 , |yjY 〉 , |xjX〉 ∈ {|0〉 , |1〉}.
(iii) Blind Trent creates a permutation P of a set
of {1, 2, ..., N} as follows [18]:
P =
[
1 2 ... N
P (1) P (2) ... P (N)
]
(5)
P (i) can be expressed in binary string as
follows:
Pbinary(i) =P
0(i)P 1(i)...P k−1(i)
P j(i) ∈ [0, 1] (6)
Where k = log2(P (i)). Then Blind Trent
prepares a quantum state |P (i)〉 from Pbinary(i)
using by computational bases (0→|0〉 and
1→|1〉). Then blind Trent prepares a quantum
state of |P 〉 as follows:
|P 〉 =
N⊗
i=1
|P (i)〉 (7)
Blind Trent creates encrypted versions of that
permutation as follows:
|PA〉 = EKTA(|P 〉) (8)
|PB〉 = EKTB(|P 〉) (9)
EK(.) is a quantum one-time pad encryption
algorithm which is firstly defined by Kim et.
al. [19] and used by Yılmaz [18] to improve
security of the protocol against forgery attacks.
To further improve the security of this quan-
tum encryption algorithm, we reorganized the
algorithm of Zhang et. al. [20] as follows:
EK (|I〉)=
⊗N−1
i=0
σx
K8iσz
K8i+1Tσx
K8i+2σz
K8i+3
Tσx
K8i+4σz
K8i+5Tσx
K8i+6σz
K8i+7 |Ii〉
(10)
T =
i√
3
(σx − σy + σz) (11)
Due to using T , encrypted message cannot be
forged [19]. Where the key length is |K| =
8N . Then, blind Trent sends encrypted |PA〉
to Alice via quantum channel.
(iv) Alice decrypts |PA〉 and makes measurement
to obtain P [18].
(v) Alice applies QFT to NEQR image and ob-
tains following state:
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QFT (|I〉) = 1
2n
2n−1∑
Y=0
2n−1∑
X=0(
QFT
(|c0Y X ...cq−1Y Xy0Y X ...yn−1Y X x0Y X ...xn−1Y X 〉))
=
1
2n
1√
2N
2n−1∑
Y=0
2n−1∑
X=0
(
|0〉+ e2pi0.xn−1YX |1〉
)
⊗
(
|0〉+ e2pi0.xn−2YX xn−1YX |1〉
)
⊗ ...
⊗
(
|0〉+ e2pi0.c0YXc1YX ...xn−1YX |1〉
)
(12)
Where N = q+2n. Also we show it as follows:
N−1⊗
i=0
|Ii〉 = 1
2n
2n−1∑
Y=0
2n−1∑
X=0
q−1⊗
i=0
|CiY X〉
n−1⊗
j=0
|yjY 〉
n−1⊗
j=0
|xjX〉
QFT (|I〉) = 1√
2N
N−1⊗
i=0
QFT (|Ii〉)
3.2. Signing Phase
(i) Alice reorder QFT (|Ii〉) states with permuta-
tion of blind Trent.
|A(Q)〉 =SWAP (P (i))(QFT (|Ii〉))
i = 0...N − 1 (13)
(ii) Alice encrypts all qubits of Eq. 13 with secret
key KAB.
|A(S)〉 =EKABPA(i) (|A(Q)〉)
i = 0...N − 1
(14)
(iii) Alice sends |A(S)〉 to Bob via quantum chan-
nel.
(iv) Alice encrypts QFT (|Ii)〉 with secret key KAB
with the encryption algorithm [18] (see refer-
ences there in) and sends to blind Trent via
quantum channel.
|AT (S)〉 = EKAB(QFT (|Ii〉)) (15)
(v) Blind Trent encrypts the |AT (S)〉 with the
secret key KTB.
|TB(S)〉 = EKTB(|AT (S)〉) (16)
Then, blind Trent sends the above encrypted
state to Bob via quantum channel.
3.3. Verification Phase
(i) Bob decrypts |TB(S)〉 with the secret key
KBT and gets |AT (S)〉. Then, Bob de-
crypts the states |AT (S)〉 with KAB and gets
QFT (|Ii〉) states. Bob applies QFT−1 and
measures the |Ii〉 states as the stage of image
retrieving in [5] and saves the results as I˜ .
(ii) Bob decrypts |A(S)〉 by using secret key KAB
and obtains |A(Q)〉.
(iii) Bob asks to blind Trent for permutation. Then,
blind Trent sends |PB〉 to Bob via quantum
channel. Bob decrypts |PB〉, makes measure-
ment and obtains P . Bob reorder |A(Q)〉 states
with permutation of blind Trent and obtains
QFT (|Ii〉).
QFT (|Ii〉) =SWAP (P (i))(|A(Q)〉)
i = 0...N − 1 (17)
(iv) Bob applies QFT−1 and gets |Ii〉, then makes
measurement onto that states as stage of the
image retrieving in [5] and obtains I¯ . Bob
checks equality of I˜ and I¯ . If I˜ = I¯ , Bob
will announce that the signature is valid, other-
wise the signature is rejected and the protocol
is aborted. If the image is valid, then Bob
encrypts the valid image I with encryption
algorithm.
|BT (S)〉 = EKBT (|Ii〉) (18)
Then Bob sends |BT (S)〉 to blind Trent.
(v) Blind Trent decrypts |BT (S)〉 with secret key
KBT and measures the states as the stage of
image retrieving in [5] and obtains I¯ .
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(vi) Blind Trent also asks Alice for sending I to
him. Alice encrypts the valid image I with
encryption algorithm.
|AT (S)〉 = EKAT (|Ii〉) (19)
Then Alice sends |AT (S)〉 to blind Trent.
(vii) Trent decrypts |AT (S)〉 with secret key KAT
and measures the states as the stage of image
retrieving in [5] and obtains I˜ . Blind Trent
checks the equality of the I˜ and I¯ . If they
are equal then stores the image I with Alice’s
identification for later traceability.
4. Security Analysis
Main requirements of the quantum digital signa-
ture protocols to provide unconditionally security
are that the signature should not be repudiated
by the signatory, and any attacker cannot forgery
signatory’s signature.
4.1. Impossibility of Forgery
Firstly, we consider insider attacker for the pro-
tocol. We assume that Bob is illegal participant and
wants to create a signature of Alice. Even if Bob
knows the details of the signature protocol he cannot
create Alice’s signature because of blind Trent. Bob
cannot create Alice’s signature without knowledge
of blind Trent. After the end of the legal signature
protocol, Bob may change correct image I to I¯ .
Because of the knowledge about correct I of blind
Trent, Bob cannot achieve forgery.
Secondly, any attacker may try to forge Alice’s
signature. Any attacker cannot achieve forgery be-
cause the states in the results of the QFT (|Ii〉)
can be reordered with blind Trent’s permutation to
produce a correct signature of Alice. Even if any
attacker can get the permutation, the permutation
will be changed by blind Trent for every signature
session. Blind Trent must be part of the protocol.
So any attacker cannot achieve collective forgery.
Further, any attacker may change QFT (|Ii〉) state
by applying unitary transformation. Then, Bob and
blind Trent can decide changed state by comparing
I and I¯ .
4.2. Impossibility of Repudiation
In the protocol, Alice and Bob cannot repudiate
the signature because of the management of pro-
tocol by blind Trent. Blind Trent controls some
communication steps of the protocol. If Alice can
send different ˜|I〉 to the blind Trent and claim that
the signature is not mine. Blind Trent can check
the equality of the ˜|I〉 from Alice and ¯|I〉 from
Bob. Blind Trent can decide whether the signature
protocol is valid or not.
5. Conclusion
Security of NEQR Quantum Image by Using
Quantum Fourier Transform with Blind Trent is
suggested. Alice expresses the image |I〉 into phase-
space by using QFT . So the image |I〉 is ex-
pressed in phases of the output qubits of QFT .
This improves the image security. Alice changes
order of the output qubits of the QFT according
to permutation information which is sent by blind
Trent. So any attacker does not know order of the
qubits and also they cannot create a valid signature.
In the encrypting algorithm, the length of keys is
increased to the 8-bit to improve the security. Any
information (classical or quantum) in the protocol
is sent by using encryption algorithm which is
robust against forgery by insider/outsider attacker.
Furthermore, decoy states can be used to be aware
of Eve.
Bob can verify validity of the signature by the
help of the blind Trent. Blind Trent must send the
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order of the qubits to the Bob to obtain real message
|I〉 by using QFT−1.
The above security analysis implies that given
protocol based on QFT provides unconditionally
security. In addition, our protocol provides higher
efficiency, effective secret key usage and security
for the transfer of NEQR images.
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